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BURLESQUE OF LITERARY PROPERTY AS INFRINGEMENT OF
COPYRIGHT
Introduction
The form of art known as burlesque is resorted to extensively
in the United States and Great Britain as a source of entertain-
ment and criticism. Burlesque and its almost indistinguishable
associates, parody and mimicry, form the backbone of comedy
as seen and heard on television, radio, and motion pictures. Many
of today's comedy programs feature humorous skits based on
serious dramatic works, including books, plays and movies. Al-
though details are changed to convert what was written in a
serious vein into a humorous farce, the situations and sequences
of events are often quite similar. Generally, no attempt is made
to disguise the travesty as an independent work. In many in-
stances such use of burlesque approaches infringement of copy-
right. This writing proposes to investigate the claim frequently
made that burlesque enjoys immunity from infringement actions
under the doctrine of "fair use," and to estimate the extent of
the protection that is afforded. If no special protection is granted
by the copyright law, a considerable restriction must necessarily
be placed upon creators of comedy.
Burlesque is technically defined as:
[A] form of the comic in art, consisting broadly in an
imitation of a work of art with the object of exciting laughter, by
distortion or exaggeration, by turning, for example, the highly
rhetorical into bombast, the pathetic into the mock-sentimental, and
especially by a ludicrous contrast between the subject and the
style .... I
Under the Copyright Act authors receive the exclusive right
"to perform or represent the copyrighted work publicly if it be
a drama .... "2 A copyright owner who contends that his rights
1 4 ENcYcLoPAEDIA BRImANNCA 423 (14th ed. 1938).
2 17 U.S.C. § 1 (d) (1952).
NOTES
have been infringed must show both the defendant's access to
the material and identity of the copyrighted original with the
alleged infringing product.3 Intent to infringe need not be
proved,4 and the test of similarity is not what the defendant
intended to represent, but whether the copying would be discern-
ible to the general public.5 However, under certain conditions
depending on the individual case, copyrighted material may law-
fully be used. This is the long established doctrine of "fair use,"
based on the implied consent 6 of the copyright holder to the use
of his material by subsequent authors. The policy of "encourag-
ing the dissemination of knowledge, learning and culture" to
the general public outweighs the desire to protect the individual
author's rights in his literary creation.7
Among the many applications of "fair use" is the right of a
critic to review a copyrighted work and to include in his review
portions of the work.
... [Njo one can doubt that a reviewer may fairly cite largely
from the original work, if his design be really and truly to use the
passages for the purpose of fair and reasonable criticism.8
It is certainly true that burlesque, while used chiefly today to
create humor, can be and frequently has been a sharp weapon
of criticism. However, no critic may quote so much of the book,
movie, drama, etc. that he is reviewing as to substitute his re-
view for the original. This would constitute direct competition
with the copyrighted material and is universally prohibited.9 If
3 Carew v. RJ.KO. Radio Pictures, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Cal. 1942);
Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621 (S.D. Cal. 1938).
4 Chappell & Co. v. Costa, 45 F. Supp. 544 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
5 Lewis v. Kroger Co., 109 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.W.Va. 1952); Barbadillo v.
Goldwyn, 42 F.2d 881 (S.D. Cal. 1930); Roe-Lawton v. Hal E. Roach Studios,
18 F.2d 126 (S.D. Cal. 1927).
6 DEWoLF, AN OUTLINE OF COPYRIGHT LAw 142 (1925). For a comprehen-
sive presentation of the application of "fair use," see Yanlkwich, What Is
Fair Use?, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 203 (1954). Judge Yankwich mentions twelve
different instances in which the "fair use" doctrine permits copying of
copyright material. He includes satires and parodies in his list of examples,
but the article does not discuss them in detail.
7 BALL, LAWV OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 259 (1944). The author
further states that the reason underlying the "fair use" doctrine is that it
is "a necessary incident of the constitutional policy of promoting the prog-
ress of science and the useful arts . . ." See W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin
Law Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82, 89 (6th Cir. 1928).
8 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 Fed. Cas. 342, 344, No. 4901 (C.C. Mass. 1841); BALL,
op. cit. supra note 7, at 289.
9 Folsom v. Marsh, supra note 8, at 345; AiauR, COPYRIGHiT LAW AmU PRAc-
Tics 757 (1936). The English rule is the same. Wilkins v. Aikin, 17 Ves. Jr.
422, 34 Eng. Rep. 163 (Ch. 1810).
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the object of the burlesque is only to present a fair and rea-
sonable criticism, it is presumed that the ordinary rules applied
to newspaper reviews prevail.'0 In the great majority of enter-
tainment shows a burlesque is presented not to criticize the
book or play or motion picture, but to create humor for the
audience. Only well-known copyright works are made the sub-
ject of a burlesque. Viewed in that light, burlesque is a compli-
ment to its subject and cannot be classified under the privilege
of criticisms.
Burlesque as "Fair Use"
Is there then a separate judicially established "fair use" which
protects burlesques? Some of the older cases indicate an affirma-
tive answer. Although no American case definitely states such
a proposition, several cases with fact situations closely allied to
the problems of burlesque hint at such "fair use."
In Green v. Minzensheimer," there was a night club act in
which a singer burlesqued the style and voice of several famous
singers; but no infringement of copyright was found, although
in imitating one singer, portions of a copyrighted song were used.
Mimicry of another singer's gestures and postures has been per-
mitted as "fair use," even though the act of imitation involved
the singing of the chorus of a copyrighted song.' 2 The court
reasoned that the mimicry was not a copying of the copyrighted
song, but a representation only of that singer's style. The female
singer was closely associated with the song in the public's mind,
but her actions were not protected by the copyright. The court
said:
Surely a parody would not infringe the copyright of the work
parodied, merely because a few lines of the original might be
textually reproduced. No doubt, the good faith of such mimicry
is an essential element....13
But in Green v. Luby,14 decided by the same court that de-
30 Yankwich, supra note 6, at 208, says that the test to determine whether
a critic's review infringes the copyrighted work "involves consideration of
(a) the value of the quoted portion, and (b) its effect in serving as a sub-
stitute for the original work." If the review is so comprehensive as to elimi-
nate the necessity of reading the copyrighted article, the bounds of "fair
use" have been exceeded.
31 177 Fed. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) (denying motion for preliminary injunction).
12 Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 Fed. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903).
13 Id. at 978.
14 177 Fed. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
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cided Green v. Minzensheimer15 in the same year, infringement
was found when an entire copyrighted song was sung during
the course of an imitation of another singer. The effect of the
defendant's mimicry was not merely to burlesque the style of
the original singer but to actually present the copyrighted song,
a result definitely opposed to the policy of protection to authors
underlying the copyright statute. The courts look at the effect
of the copying rather than the intention of the defendant.
1 6
Another case which does indicate that burlesque might be a
fair use is Glyn v. Weston Feature Film Co.,'7 a suit claiming
infringement of a novel by the defendant's motion picture bur-
lesque. The court said that a burlesque does not constitute
copyright infringement where the author of the burlesque has
applied creative thinking to his product. However, this state-
ment is only a dictum inasmuch as the judge decided there was
not a sufficient resemblance to warrant a charge of violation
of the original author's rights.
Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System
The Glyn case' s was as far as any of the decisions had ever
gone in deciding to what extent burlesques could copy a previ-
ous author's work.19 No court was ever called upon to uphold
the existence of this employment of "fair use" until it was
presented as the chief defense in Loew's Inc. v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, decided May 6, 1955.20 The fact situa-
tion there is identical with the problem under discussion. The
holders of the copyright of the motion picture "Gaslight" sought
to enjoin the performance of a burlesque of the picture by Jack
15 Id. at 286. The court in Green v. Luby, supra note 14, distinguished
Green v. Minzensheimer by pointing out that in the latter case there was no
music accompanying the song.
16 See note 4 supra.
17 [1916] 1 Ch. 261 (1915).
18 Ibid.
19 Lowenfels v. Nathan, 2 F. Supp. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 1932), was concerned with
the same factual situation in that defendant's musical comedy, described as
a burlesque, was claimed to infringe on plaintifFs operatic tragedy. How-
ever, the court was not asked to rule that the defense 'f "fair use" pro-
tected burlesques. So the court looked only to see if there was a substan-
tial taking.
20 131 F. Supp. 165 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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Benny, a popular television and radio comedian.- The defense
made no attempt to deny substantial copying of the motion pic-
ture; instead it asserted that burlesque itself is a "fair use." The
court's opinion exhaustively discussed the latter doctrine, con-
sidering all the decisions mentioned above which in any way
touched on the permissive use of criticism, abridgment, parody,
mimicry and burlesque. The court stated its conclusion:
Turning now to American cases involving parody or burlesque,
we find illuminating early decisions. The attempt to defend against
copyright infringement by the claim that the infringing work was
"merely a parody or burlesque" is not new. Such an attempt
has been the subject of several decisions and has been disposed of,
not by determining whether the alleged infringing use was parody
or burlesque, but by ascertaining whether it amounted to a taking
of substantial, copyrightable material. In other words, a parodized
or burlesqued taking is treated no differently from any other ap-
propriation.2 2 (Emphasis added.)
The effect of the decision is to rule that a burlesque cannot
copy a substantial part of a copyrighted work with complete
impunity simply because it is a burlesque and not an independent
work. Implicit in the holding is a comparison of values as was
explained previously in the general discussion of "fair use."
The court decided that the entertainment value to the public
of a burlesque skit, which copies to a great extent the material
in the original, is of less importance than the protection which
should be afforded the copyright holder. When considered in
this perspective, it is submitted, the case was correctly decided.
The Reduction of Demand Factor
In at least one respect, however, it is difficult to understand
why a burlesque which turns a serious drama into a humorous
farce is such an unfair use of the original material. Reference
is made to the factor of injury to the copyright holder, pre-
sumably by the partial or complete satisfaction by the burlesque
21 Benny's humorous burlesque, produced for radio and television, was
considerably shorter than the picture; but the sequence of events and the
principal characters were practically the same. Anyone who had seen the
picture would readily observe the close similarity between "Gaslight" and
the burlesque. Of course, the movie was a serious drama while the bur-
lesque turned the effect into comedy.
22 131 F. Supp. 165, 176-177. (The court's footnotes are omitted). The court
cited Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, supra note 12, for the rule that a parody
which uses only a small part of the copyrighted matter does not infringe.
The part used of the song in the Bloom case was the popular chorus, how-
ever, and this was sufficient to make the audience think of the original song.
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of the general public's desire to see or hear the serious produc-
tion. This factor of competition is not present. For example,
can it reasonably be contended that anyone who would see
Jack Benny's burlesque of a serious motion picture would be
less inclined to see the picture afterward? It is extremely
doubtful that the type of burlesque under discussion here would
diminish the profits of the copyright holder. Admittedly, the
plot and the sequence of events are similar,23 but the whole
effect has been changed from serious drama to comedy. Two
entirely different types of enjoyment are under consideration.
Creation of humor does not satisfy the desire to witness or hear
a serious dramatic production.
The answer of the court in Loew's Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
System is a complete denial of the validity of the argument.
We conclude that it is not incumbent on the copyright holder to
show either damage, or a diminuting of the value of his property
or a lessening of the demand for the copyrighted work.24
Many cases can be cited in support of this proposition which
holds that it is not necessary to prove a reduction in demand
for the original work in order to establish infringement.25 How-
ever, the importance of this factor must not be overlooked.
CoxU-us JuRIs SECuNDUM, after stating the same rule, continues:
Nevertheless the cases frequently lay stress on the fact of competi-
tion, or the lack of it, in determining whether the amount of mat-
ter copied is reasonable in amount and character or is an infringe-
ment, and it is safe to say that where the later work differs greatly
in nature, scope, and purpose from the original, a larger liberty in
making quotations and extracts will be permitted... .26
If the burlesque is in a different form of art than that which
is copied, the court is less likely to find an injury to the copy-
23 131 F. Supp. 165, 170-171.
24 Id. at 184.
25 Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D.
Pa. 1938); Falk v. Donaldson, 57 Fed. 32, 36-37 (S.D.N.Y. 1893).
26 18 C.J.S., Copyright and Literary Property §94(c) (3) (1939), which is
also quoted in Karll v. Curtis Pub. Co., 39 F. Supp. 836, 837-838, (E.D.Wis.
1941). The text in C.J.S. also states, §94 (c) (2): ".... [T]he court must look
to the nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of
the materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale,
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects of the original work." See
Mathews Conveyer Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 84-85 (6th Cir.
1943); National Institute, Inc. v. Nutt, 28 F.2d 132, 135 (D. Conn. 1928),
aff'd, 31 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1929); M. Witmark & Sons v. Pastime Amuse-




Reduction in popular demand for the copyrighted work, caused
by the competition of the infringing burlesque has several times
been the overriding factor in the court's determination of in-
fringement. Hill v. Whalen & Martel2 8 is a famous example.
There the defendant's use of two cartoon characters, "Nutt"
and "Gift", was held to infringe the copyright of the more
famous "Mutt and Jeff." The court found a decrease in pop-
ularity of the plaintiff's comic strip and held that this test, as
to whether there has been a material reduction in the demand
for the original, is decisive. In most cases, however, this test
of diminution of sales is only a factor to be considered in the
determination of infringement. "[T]he effect upon distribution
and objects of the original work" is one of the elements the
court must consider. 29 How important a factor it is will deter-
mine to what extent burlesques can make use of copyrighted
matter in the future.
Courts also have considered the factor of intent in their
determination of infringement. Intent to infringe is not a requi-
site of proof, but "it goes to fill out the whole picture." 30
On consideration, it is submitted that the factor of competi-
tion is false and misleading and should not be very deter-
minative. The holder of a copyright has the complete right to
do with it as he pleases. Even if he does not wish to use it
at all, he may prevent others from doing so. With reference
to burlesques, the argument that the burlesque would not
diminish income for the copyrighted material is defeated if it
is remembered that the copyright holder could also, if he so
desired, burlesque his creation and hence would be entitled to
the profits thereof. His right to do so certainly transcends the
right of anyone else. The potential use by the copyright owner
would be infringed by the burlesque.
27 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Collier & Son, 26 U.S.P.Q. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
Various quotations from the principal song in a popular musical comedy
were interspersed in a serial story appearing in a national magazine. An
injunction was denied because no real competition existed.
28 220 Fed. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). See also National Institute, Inc. v. Nutt,
supra note 26. An English case, Hanfstaengl v. W. H. Smith & Sons, [1905]
1 Ch. 519, 528, utilizes the same test. Infringement was found because the
imitation "tends directly to prevent the sale of the plaintiff's goods by rea-
son of the familiarity of the public with a base form." Cf. Boosey v. Empire
Music Co., 224 Fed. 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
29 New York Tribune, Inc. v. Otis & Co., 39 F. Supp. 67, 68 (S.D.N.Y.
1941).
30 Broadway Music Corp. v. F-R Pub. Corp., 31 F. Supp. 817, 818 (S.D.N.Y.
1940). Cf. New York Tribune, Inc. v. Otis & Co., supra note 29.
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Purpose of the Burlesque - Commercial Benefit
An important consideration in determination of infringement
appears to be the purpose for which the copying is made.3
The cases mentioned heretofore have intimated that if the copy
does not reduce the demand for the copyrighted creation there
is at least less probability that infringement will be adjudged.
However, it has been held that if the purpose of the copying
is not primarily the advancement of the arts or sciences, but
is to gain commercial benefit for the copier, such use will be
held unfair.3 2 The argument in favor of unrestricted use of
burlesque, which so successfully passes the reduction of demand
test, ignominiously falters here. A humorous skit based on a
dramatic production provides humor, of course, but ultimately
it is staged to commercially benefit the producer. This test was
asserted in a case involving the use in an advertisement for
cigarettes of the copyrighted statements of a doctor.33 Judge
Yankwich in his discussion of "fair use" endorses this qualifi-
cation. "If . . . the appropriation of the copyrighted product of
another is motivated by the desire to derive commercial benefit,
the use, regardless of quantity, is unfair."3 4
Another author on copyrights 35 has also approved of the
doctrine of infringement where there is a commercial motive.
Ball admits the importance of the reduction in demand factor
but says that even in a situation in which the original and the
copying works are "wholly different in their nature, scope and
purpose," if the later use is for a profitable commercial gain,
it is unfair usage.36
This factor of commercial benefit to the defendant charged
with infringement of copyright has not always been so decisive.
Many of the decisions already mentioned held that there was
no infringement even though the work in which the copying
was included was designed to earn financial profit.37 This fact
31 Green v. Luby, 177 Fed. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1909).
32 Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D.
Pa. 1938).
33 Ibid.
34 Yankwich, supra note 6, at 209. The quoted statement is in reference to
reviews and criticisms, which under certain conditions have the protection
of the "fair use" doctrine.
35 BALL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 262.
36 Ibid. The author also is speaking here of critical reviews, stating that if
the article is published only to gain commercial benefit, instead of for pro-
fessional motives, it is a violation of the "fair use" protection afforded to
such writings.
37 Karll v. Curtis Pub Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941); Green v. Min-
zensheimer, 177 Fed. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1909); Bloom & Hamlin v. Nixon, 125
Fed. 977 (E.D. Pa. 1903).
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and the context of the statements endorsing the concept indicate
that it applies primarily to the activities which receive judicial
protection as "fair use," i.e., criticisms, digests, encyclopedias,
imitations of methods and systems, etc.
Conclusion
It is increasingly evident, especially since Loew's Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, that entertainment taking the form of a
burlesque of serious dramas, novels, etc., has no extraordinary
legal armor to defend itself against charges of infringement.
"Fair use" does not permit burlesque to appropriate substantial
parts of copyrighted material. Thus, in deciding questions of
infringement in any future cases, the courts will apply the
ordinary tests for infringement. The burlesque may not appro-
priate a substantial part of the original material. 8 Of course,
copyright law does permit the use of the same ideas, pro-
vided the first author's expression of his ideas is not appro-
priated. 19 This will be the problem area for burlesque humor
writers. If the burlesque uses a largely similar sequence of
details and events, which is "the very web of the author's dra-
matic expression," the use is unfair.40 Certainly, in the actual
infringement case, if it is not perfectly clear that the taking
has been a substantial one, the courts may rule for the de-
fendant on the ground that his burlesque, while somewhat
similar, presents the ideas in a different form and causes no
reduction in profits to the original. The better reasoning found
in the Holt case4 ' and the textbooks would indicate that this
factor should not be given much weight. Copyright is property
and should be protected in all its uses, whether actual or po-
tential. The development of the law in this respect affords in-
creased protection to copyright owners at the expense of the
creators of comedy. Perhaps it is to be welcomed as a spur to
more original and ingenious entertainment.
Patrick J. Foley
38 W. H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Pub. Co., 27 F.2d 82 (6th Cir. 1928);
Hill v. Whalen & Martell, 220 Fed. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914).
39 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1936),
aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1939); Seltzer v. Sunbrock, 22 F. Supp. 621, 628 (S.D.
Cal. 1938); Dymow v. Bolton, 11 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926).
40 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 55 (2d Cir. 1936),
aff'd, 309 U.S. 390 (1939); Daly v. Palmer, 6 Fed. Cas. 1132, No. 3552 (S.D.N.Y.
1868).
41 Henry Holt & Co. v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., supra note 32.
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